Bohr's point -and the central point of quantum mechanics -is that no elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered (observed) phenomenon (Wheeler).
It will not do to read it as based on esoteric philosophical principles; it will not do to justify it by mathematical or physical arguments that were then unfamiliar.
The answer had better lie more on the surface of his writings.
What is wrong with complementarity as based on philosophical principles?
The answer is not only that it would then have hardly had much appeal among physicists; it is that it would have had too broad a scope, and pilot-wave theory 2 The argument that pilot-wave theory incorporates the same ontology as Everett's has been made by Brown and Wallace [15] . I would only add that if it is to be resisted, it is at the price of denying the intelligibility of the state-reduction approach altogether (so this too faces a "problem of rationality", according to the pilot-wave theory). 3 Howard's [26] is a possible exception, but as he himself says, his account is a reconstruction rather than an exegesis of Bohr's interpretation. the preface to this collection, the "Introductory Survey" [2, pp. , first published in 1929 (in Danish) as an accompaniment to the Danish translations of these articles. In the German and English translations this was read almost as widely as the Como lecture itself. And the third is Bohr's response to Einstein, Podolski, and Rosen (the EPR argument), published in 1935 [5] ; that followed several years of debate with Einstein over foundations and in effect marked their conclusion. Any account of Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics that is not clearly embodied in these three texts is worthless for our purposes.
Better still is an account consistent with these and with Bohr's own evaluation of his thinking in this period. That we have in his contribution to the Schilpp volume in the Library of Living Philosophers devoted to Einstein, published in 1949 [8] ; there Bohr reappraised both the Como lecture and his discussions with Einstein. In this spirit one other article is worth special mention, "Quantum physics and philosophy -causality and complementarity" published in 1958 [9] . It was Bohr's last presentation of complementarity. According to his son and executor Aage Bohr, he felt that there he expressed some of its key concepts more clearly and concisely than he had elsewhere. Bohr died in 1962.
My claim is that in these writings Bohr is most clearly and consistently read as a realist, albeit of an operational persuasion; that his goal was to present a framework in which quantum phenomena were to be analyzed in classical terms; and that he argued for this framework in terms of principles, and specifically the principle of complementarity, as scientific principles, broadly empirical in scope, rather than philosophical ones, that stood independent of idealism or neo-Kantianism (or any other school in philosophy). And in these respects I maintain he was largely successful.
None of this is to say that it was reasonable, circa the late 1920s and '30s, to embrace Bohr's views and to reject de Broglie's and Einstein's; but it is a step in the right direction. I shall have a further comment to make on this at the end.
THE COMO LECTURE
In 1927 Bohr's point of departure was the quantum postulate. A principle of that name had long been familiar to the old quantum theory, as defined by the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization rules (the principle that any change in action, with the units of angular momentum, must be an integral multiple of Planck's constant h). Of quantum mechanics, he began:
Its essence may be expressed in the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories and symbolized by Planck's constant of action. [2, p.53] Bohr immediately went on to say that the quantum postulate "implies a renunciation as regards the causal spacetime coordination of atomic processes".
Both claims were by then contentious, given that Schrödinger had deduced the quantization rule as a consequence of boundary conditions for the solutions of a continuous wave equation only the previous year. It may be that Bohr was convinced, with the experience of the failure of the Bohr, Kramers and Slater theory just behind him, that if energy and momentum were conserved in individual processes then quantum jumps were just as unavoidable in wave mechanics as in matrix mechanics (Schrödinger's wave function and Slater's virtual radiation field were closely allied). Later on in the Como lecture Bohr spoke of wave mechanics as "a symbolic transcription" that is "only to be interpreted by an explicit use of the quantum postulate". On two occasions he spoke of the postulate as "irrational" (as in "...we meet...the inevitability of the feature of irrationality characterizing the quantum postulate"). This makes the abandonment of causal spacetime descriptions look like an assumption from the very beginning.
But the argument that followed was more circumspect. There was a special sense in which the causal, spacetime idea of explanation was to be weakened.
Here is the argument on its first appearance:
Now, the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of observation not to be neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation.
Bohr argues from the quantum postulate, understood as implying an ineliminable interaction on observation, to a "no-separation" principle -that the object of observation is inseparably bound up with the experimental context. Similar claims may be found in all his subsequent writings on quantum mechanics.
Bohr continued:
After all, the concept of observation is in so far arbitrary as it depends upon which objects are included in the subsystem to be observed. Ultimately, every observation can, of course, be reduced to our sense perceptions. The circumstance, however, that in interpreting observations use has always to be made of theoretical notions entails that for every particular case it is a question of convenience at which point the concept of observation involving the quantum postulate with its inherent "irrationality" is brought in.
Bohr here and subsequently is certainly preoccupied with "observation", with
experiments -on what can be said of the microscopic realm on the basis of experiments. To this extent his philosophy was broadly operationalist. On the other hand his position is far from positivist, in Mach's sense: Bohr is clear that observations, whether or not they are reducible to sense impressions (as it happens he grants that they are), must be expressed in terms of concepts -they are interpreted -and in this precisely where one puts the boundary between the observed system and the context of the observation is somewhat arbitrary.
Bohr repeatedly spoke of "measurement" ("agencies of measurement") in the sequel: the boundary at issue for Bohr as much marks the distinction between the context of the experiment and the object under investigation, as between "the observer" and "the observed". In his later writings it was the former that was increasingly to the fore.
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He immediately continues:
This situation has far-reaching consequences. On one hand, the definition of the state of a physical system, as ordinarily understood, claims the elimination of all external disturbances. But in that case, according to the quantum postulate, any observation will be impossible, and, above all, the concepts of space and time lose their immediate sense. On the other hand, if in order to make observation possible we permit certain interactions with suitable agencies of measurement, not belonging to the system, an unambiguous definition of the state of the system is no longer possible, and there can be no question of causality in the ordinary sense of the word.
The very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to regard the space-time co-ordination and the claim of causality, the union of which characterizes the classical theories, as complementary but exclusive features of the description, symbolizing the idealization of observation and definition respectively. [2, p.54, emphasis original] This is the first time that the word "complementary" was used by Bohr.
The simplest reading of this passage is more strongly operationalist: the concepts of space and time have no meaning independent of a context of observation. As a philosophical doctrine it will therefore apply equally to classical physics. The difference, for microscopic quantum phenomena, is that the act of observation cannot under any circumstances be neglected. Because of the quantum postulate, there is an irreducible coupling between apparatus and measured system, that cannot be made arbitrarily small. 6 A microscopic system to which spacetime coordinates can be assigned can therefore never be considered a closed system, not even as an idealization. So equations of motion in the customary form are not available; what equations may be found for it will not conserve energy and momentum; no "causal" description is possible. In this sense spacetime coordination and causality cannot be combined. Further, at least in a number of important examples, the reciprocal nature of this limitation can be quantified by means of the uncertainty relations.
This reading is consistent with the rest of the Como lecture. There and in his later writings Bohr repeatedly gave examples to show that the attempt to
give an operational meaning to the spatiotemporal coordinates of a phenomenon leads to an uncontrollable flow of momentum and energy into and out of the system, of just such an amount as to satisfy the uncertainty relations. As of the Como lecture the foundation of the latter was the de Broglie relations:
in them the "fundamental contrast between the quantum of action and the classical concepts is immediately apparent". Momentum and energy (the basis of a "causal" description) is thereby related to wavelength and frequency; with that the uncertainty relations (or near neighbours of them) follow immediately:
At the same time, the possibility of identifying the velocity of the particle with the group-velocity indicates the field of application of -the doctrine that neither the agency of observation nor the object observed can be ascribed "independent reality in the ordinary physical sense"? Bohr presented this conclusion as an immediate consequence of the impossibility of neglecting the measurement interaction, but it is not clear if this is a reference to the "individuality" of an atomic process -whatever, precisely, that may meanor its "essential discontinuity". But either way, Bohr is evidently taking it as an "external disturbance" to a system (for only then does it imply that on measurement a system cannot be free of any external disturbance). It is tempting to go on to take Bohr to mean "disturbance" in its normal sense, as a causal physical process. With that one is led very quickly to simple-minded disturbance theory of measurement. The observed system is disturbed by its interaction with the measuring apparatus, so it can no longer be treated as isolated (and the energy-momentum conservation laws will no longer hold for it, so "causality" is violated).
The disturbance theory of measurement had the virtues of simplicity and clarity, and it was certainly popular; it figured in many of the early texts in quantum mechanics; but it falls foul to obvious objections. Why not seek to correct for the disturbance, as one does classically, in cases where the measurement interaction is not in fact negligible? (obviating the no-separation principle).
Why not, to this end, include the measuring apparatus in with the measured system, and model the interaction between the two directly, in quantum me- But not all of Bohr's assumptions were properly in evidence in the Como lecture. Bohr spoke of adhering to the classical concepts -but why should we?
The challenge was made shortly after by Schrödinger in correspondence: that interesting as the limitations of the classical concepts were, as subject to the uncertainty relations
[I]t seems to me imperative to demand the introduction of new concepts, in which this limitation no longer occurs. Since what is unobservable in principle should not at all be contained in our conceptual scheme, it should not be representable in terms of the latter.
In the adequate conceptual scheme it ought no more to seem that we up to now no clues for such a re-arrangement, but the "old"
experiential concepts seem to me to be inseparably connected with the foundation of man's power of visualising [11, p.465] He is on shaky ground, however. It was not so long before that Euclidean geometry was supposed to be the only visualizable geometry, the existence of mathematical schemes for non-Euclidean geometries notwithstanding. Bohr's position, at this point, is dogmatic.
If a point of dogma, better state it at the beginning of any argument for complementarity, and better free it from any reliance on dubious empirical claims about our "powers of visualization". It came in the very first paragraph of the "Introductory Survey" to his Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature,
Only by experience itself do we come to recognize those laws which grant us a comprehensive view of the diversity of phenomena. As our knowledge becomes wider, we must always be prepared, therefore, to expect alterations in the points of view best suited for the ordering of our experience. In this connection we must remember, The jump from the necessity and unrevisability of the concepts of everyday experience to that of the fundamental concepts of classical theories was unsubstantiated, however. 7 But almost no-one apart from Schrödinger saw this as a weakness of Bohr's interpretation; and certainly not Einstein, his principal critic.
7 One might wonder if, far from exhausting the concepts available in the description of our experience, the use of classical concepts is even so much as consistent with quantum mechanics. This question, of whether classical concepts, taken individually, could so much as be employed in the quantum domain, had guided Heisenberg in his discovery of the uncertainty relations; his conclusion was that they could (and that only their simultaneous deployment was circumscribed) so Bohr's piecemeal use of them did at least have Heisenberg's sanction. In Heisenberg's words: "All concepts which can be used in classical theory for the description of a mechanical system can also be defined exactly for atomic processes in analogy to the classical concepts." [25, p.68, emphasis original]. (In point of fact, the claim at this level of generality runs very quickly into trouble. Shortly after, Jordan and Dirac both noted the difficulties of giving any meaning to the time or phase as self-adjoint operators obeying canonical commutation relations with the energy, if the latter is to have a point spectrum. Mathematically, the difficulty is that no quantization procedure has been found in which the full symmetry group of classical phase space, the symplectic group, can be implemented as a group of unitary transformations on a Hilbert space.)
BOHR'S RESPONSE TO THE EPR ARGU-MENT
The early 1930s were the must crucial years for the interpretation of quantum mechanics. They followed much publicized and visible encounters between Einstein and Bohr on the subject of foundations (in particular at the 6th Solvay The view is very widely held that Bohr, without admitting it, shifted his position markedly in the face of these developments, and above all the EPR argument. That would be a damaging admission, if true; for not only would Bohr stand revealed as an opportunist, it would show that the community embraced quite distinct orthodoxies without even realizing it. Fortunately, however, whilst there undoubtedly were shifts in Bohr's position, they effected his argumentative strategy more than its substance. On substance the changes were subtle.
This claim needs to be justified. Bohr frequently remarked on the value he placed on his discussions with Einstein, almost all of which took place before Einstein's departure for America. Here is a lesson he said he learned early from them:
The extent to which renunciation of the visualization of atomic phenomena is imposed upon us by the impossibility of their subdivision is strikingly illustrated by the following example to which Einstein very early called attention and often has reverted. If a semi-reflecting mirror is placed in the way of a photon, having two possibilities for its direction of propagation, the photon may either be recorded on one, and only one, of two photographic plates situated at great distances in the two directions in question, or else we may, by replacing the plates by mirrors, observe effects exhibiting an interference between the two reflected wave-trains. In any attempt of a pictorial representation of the behaviour of the photon we would, thus, meet with the difficulty: to be obliged to say, on the one hand, that the photon always chooses one of the two ways and, on the other hand, that it behaves as if it had passed both ways. [8, p.221] It is an early example of a delayed-choice experiment. One must change the description of a system in the past, needed to explain a measurement, depending on which of two measurements one chooses to make later on.
In one respect this is worse than any non-locality in space, as was shortly to be demonstrated by the EPR argument [22] : it is an action of the present on the past. 8 It is a case in which the phenomenon is contextualized to the experimental conditions; it illustrates Bohr's "no-separation" principle. Bohr had, moreover, already met with attempts by Einstein to extend this to nonlocality in a predictive sense (I shall come back to these in a moment). If the paper of Einstein et al really came as an "onslaught...as a bolt from the blue", as Rosenfeld later said [29, p.142 ], the ideas were by no means entirely unfamiliar to Bohr (which does not of course mean that he had anticipated the argument). Nor did it take him long to respond to it, by his standardslittle over a month -in a short note in Nature [4] ; this, almost verbatim, was 8 However it was widely accepted that retrodictions have a rather different status from predictions in quantum mechanics, in view of the fact that -say from successive measurements of position of arbitrary accuracy -one can defeat the uncertainty relations. According to Bohr in the Como lecture, in such cases we deal with an "abstraction, from which no unambiguous information can be obtained". the core of the much longer reply he published in the Physical Review near the end of the year [5] . In the latter he began with well-known experiments that he had already used as examples of complementarity. According to Bohr, the EPR argument "does not actually involve any greater intricacies than the simple examples discussed above". If Bohr saw anything new in the EPR argument, he did not acknowledge it. Yet for Einstein it was conclusive proof that quantum mechanics was incomplete, a view that he held to the end of his life.
The EPR argument, recall, rested on a sufficiency condition for a quantity to be counted an "element of reality". The condition was that the quantity can be predicted with certainty "without in any way disturbing the system".
Depending on which of two experiments was performed on one system, and on the outcome obtained, the value of one or other of two non-commuting quantities associated with a second system could be predicted with certainty. Since this is so even in the absence of any interaction between the two systems, the sufficiency condition is satisfied; so both must be elements of reality. But they could not both be represented as such by any single quantum state: quantum mechanical description is therefore incomplete.
The argument turns on the key concepts of "disturbance" and "interaction" It is a wordier version of Bohr's no-separation principle, but now quite clearly divorced from the disturbance picture of measurement. It is the principle that any physically real phenomenon must be specified under definite experimental conditions, so any change in the latter must lead to a change in the former, even if no ordinary interaction is involved. To put it in spacetime terms (which neither Bohr nor Einstein et al had, given that the EPR state was defined at only a single instant of time), it is not as though one can hold a part of the phenomenon, the remote part, constant, whilst varying the experimental conditions of the local part of the phenomenon -this would be to try to visualize 9 There were special difficulties in treating the EPR state dynamically (in contrast to Bohm's later version in terms of corelated spins). Neither in the EPR paper nor in Bohr's reply was any mention made of locality. But the potential non-local character of the influence Bohr spoke of must have been obvious, given Einstein's previous criticisms of quantum mechanics.
the phenomenon in accordance with causal spacetime concepts; it would be to ignore the "individual" nature of a quantum phenomenon.
At this point the strain of not interpreting Bohr's non-mechanical interaction as entanglement, and the quantum postulate as state-reduction, becomes well-nigh intolerable, but still it should be resisted. It is not only that he never accepted these identifications, it was that for Bohr, formal concepts like entanglement and state reduction could never have been explanatory (the formalism was only an abstract calculus). To put the quantum postulate in terms of state reduction is to look at Bohr's theory from the wrong direction.
If we stay with Bohr's own terms, there is not a great deal to add in reply to Before coming to that, we should take note of what is genuinely new in Bohr's statement over and above that in the "Introductory Survey": it is his insistence that the experimental arrangement be described in a totally classical way, meaning there was no reciprocal latitude needed in any of the classical concepts involved (the uncertainty relations do not apply).
10 Use of constraints on the possible "latitudes of definition" characterizes rather the "quantum mechanical description". Thus if, in an experiment to measure the position of a particle (using a rigidly mounted diaphragm), one wishes instead to control for the momentum of the diaphragm, then it must, "as regards its position relative to the rest of the apparatus, be treated, like the particle traversing the slit, as an object of investigation, in the sense that the quantum mechanical uncertainty relations regarding its position and momentum must be taken explicitly into
One can read the shift as reflecting the need for the von Neumann "cut", but again this is to put it in terms quite foreign to Bohr. It is rather a matter of recognizing that eventually one must make use of an apparatus whose reaction to the process of measurement cannot itself be controlled. There must always come a point where it is impossible to keep track of any energy and momentum flows between the apparatus and the object that is measured (as the change in momentum of the apparatus, let alone the change in position -relative to what?
-become totally inaccessible). One way of making the point is by insisting that the uncertainty relations are not to be applied to the apparatus. 11 Along the way, insofar as Bohr has to draw a definite classical-quantum distinction, it is a convenient tidying-up exercise: why not draw it at the same place as the apparatus-object distinction?
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But it is not really needed. We can replace it, as an expression of our pragmatic situation, by the stipulation that the conditions of an experiment must ultimately involve rigid connections to bodies of arbitrarily large mass. In that case the uncertainty relations, for the latter bodies, become irrelevant (so long as there is non-zero lattitude in both position and momentum). Another tidying-up operation came shortly after his reply to EPR, and was more explicitly terminological. Recognizing, as Bohr may not have appreciated before the EPR argument, that the contextualizing of the phenomenon embodied in the no-separation principle had to be freed much more explicitly from any causal concepts, it would be handy to devise a terminology in terms of which the choice of experimental arrangement strictly does not disturb the phenomenon.
11 See Diósi [21] , for a technical treatment along these lines. 12 Howard calls this the "coincidence interpretation", and goes on to question it, suggesting, even, that subatomic particles might have been counted by Bohr as measuring instruments, so long as they are assigned the right spectrum of classical properties [26] . (My disagreement with him should be clear from the sequel.) 13 The limit of infinite mass is of course singular. But see Dickson [20] , for a rather different view of the matter.
But that is quite easy to do. As he later reported his proposal, made at Warsaw in 1938:
I warned especially against phrases, often found in the physics literature, such as "disturbing of phenomena by observation", or "creating physical attributes to atomic objects by measurement". Such phrases, which may serve to remind us of the apparent paradoxes in quantum theory, are at the same time apt to cause confusion, since words like "phenomena" and "observations", just as "attributes" and "measurements", are used in a way hardly compatible with common language and practical definition. Does it follow that there is no longer a role for the idea that quantum measurements disturb the system measured? Not in the least: it is essential, to get the whole doctrine of complementarity off the ground, that there are indeed mutually exclusive experimental arrangements. We are not talking of logical incompatibility; the point is not that if one performs a two-slit experiment one cannot at the same time perform a diffraction-grating experiment (a contradiction in terms, even though the observables that are measured commute); the incompatibility rather derives from a physical principle that implies an experiment to measure one classical quantity thereby excludes the possibility of simultaneously measuring another. Here the notion of an irreducible disturbance works perfectly well as limited to a purely local action.
14 As Bohr went on to explain, in defending the completeness of the quantum mechanical description:
On the contrary this description, 15 as appears from the preceding discussion, may be characterized as a rational utilization of all possibilities of unambiguous interpretation of measurements, compatible with the finite and uncontrollable interaction between the objects and the measurements in the field of quantum theory. [5, p.700]
There would be no difficulty in measuring the position of a shutter as well as its momentum, so performing an inclusive measurement, were it not for this local notion of an uncontrollable disturbance on measurement. Quite distinct from this is the no-separation principle, the non-local sense in which a phenomenon is defined relative to one or another of such mutually exclusive experiments.
All this being so, why did Bohr have any difficulty with the EPR paper?
Rosenfeld reported that it was not all plain sailing, or not for the first few days anyway [29] . The argument surely required a different answer to the one Bohr had presumably found to Einstein's earlier attempt to draw out the non-local import of quantum mechanics, as also reported by Rosenfeld 16 ; or the answer he had found to Einstein's "photon box" thought experiment, another precursor to the EPR argument, at the 6th Solvay conference. And the mathematical example given in the EPR paper, making use of Dirac delta-function normalization and Fourier transforms of two-particle wave functions, was hardly physically transparent. It made no reference to dynamics, and it was not interpreted in so there is plenty of ambiguity in how to set it out as a formal interpretation.
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Classical descriptions, within definite latitudes -as given by his quasi-classical formulation of the uncertainty relations -replaced quantum ones, in a procedure of doubtful generality; and it admitted, without comment or explanation, the non-local sense in which a phenomenon is defined by its context. Finally, the latter continued to be subsumed under the notion of "interaction", without comment or qualification. This was true even in his most careful statement of complementarity in 1958:
Far from restricting our efforts to put questions to nature in the form of experiments, the notion of complementarity simply characterizes the answers we can receive by such inquiry, whenever the interaction between the measuring instruments and the objects forms an integral part of the phenomena. [9, p.4] In fact all Bohr's attempts -half-hearted at best -to derive his conclusions from independent and precisely stated hypotheses must be judged failures. Witness, in 1949, the founding principle, "the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments"; and again in the very same publication, in summarizing the lesson of a variety of thought experiments, that "the main point here is the distinction between the objects under investigation and the measuring instruments which serve to define, in classical terms, the conditions under which the phenomena is only one example among many). Bohr did of course acknowledge that from the transformation theory and non-commutativity quite generally it followed "that it is never possible, in the description of the state of a mechanical system, to attach definite values to both of two canonically conjugate variables" [5, p.696] . He also acknowledged that "in the quantum mechanical description our freedom of constructing and handling the experimental arrangement finds its proper expression in the possibility of choosing the classically defined paramters entering in any proper application of the formalism" [8, p.229 ]. It does not follow that energy-momentum vs spacetime coordination do not have a special significance in his theory. It was exclusively these that were at issue in every argument and example of complementarity that he gave in the texts that we have considered. (He made two mentions of the transformation theory in the Como lecture, in neither case linking it to complementary; one other in his reply to EPR, already mentioned; and none other in his later writings.) appear." Bohr had put the latter point even more strongly in his reply to EPR:
The necessity of discriminating in each experimental arrangement between those parts of the physical system considered which are to be treated as measuring instruments and those which constitute the objects under investigation may indeed be said to form a principal distinction between classical and quantum-mechanical description of physical phenomena. [5, p.150] It is not at all clear, at this point, just what the assumptions of his theory of complementarity really are: the impossibility of making a sharp separation; the necessity for making a sharp separation; and somewhere in this, the quantum postulate.
In Bohr's final paper on the subject, he first emphasized the foundation of any kind of unambiguous physical evidence in the formation of permanent marks "such as a spot on a photographic plate caused by the impact of an electron", by processes of "irreversible amplification". The necessity of a object-apparatus divide now follows as a consequence of his earlier stipulation of 1935:
In all such points, the observation problem of quantum physics in no way differs from the classical physical approach. The essentially new feature in the analysis of quantum phenomena is, however, the introduction of a fundamental distinction between the measuring apparatus and the objects under investigation. This is a direct consequence of the necessity of accounting for the functions of the measuring instruments in purely classical terms, excluding in principle any regard for the quantum of action. [9, p.3-4] In the same essay we read that the fundamental reason why quantum indeterminism cannot be read as a species of classical statistical mechanics is:
In the case of quantum phenomena, the unlimited divisibility of events implied in such an account is, in principle, excluded by the requirement to specify the experimental conditions. Indeed, the feature of wholeness typical of proper quantum phenomena finds its logical expression in the circumstance that any attempt at a well- [T]he duality he noticed in the interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics was, in his opinion, a question of choosing the most adequate description of the experiment. If we decide to include in the enumeration of the exterior conditions all the instruments which must be used for the study of the whole phenomenon, the only arbitrary factor remaining is, as he had explained in his paper, the free choice of these experimental conditions, and, apart from this freedom, the interpretation of the solution of the problem, concerning the predictions to which the phenomenon we are studying leads, is perfectly unequivocal. [11, p.xxx] The comment is too cryptic to be really illuminating. One can read a plausible story into it: it is that the free choice of the experimental conditions determines, I see no a priori principle that rules out any of these strategies, but that is only to say that they are at the end scientific conjectures, albeit at an unusually high level of abstraction; they stand or fall by their durability and success. When it comes to complementarity, surely, the jury is by now finally in.
In its negative claims complementarity denied the possibility of a causal spacetime explanation for key experiments of quantum mechanics. In addition, Kuhn, it is has served dynamics well through its long history [31] .
I come back to the pilot-wave theory. At certain points I have said that it is a counter-example to Bohr's claims. How then could he have ignored it? Bohr's negligence in this respect may seem remarkable -so much so that it puts in 20 Bohr, in collaboration with Rosenfeld in 1933 did gave one other example of the genre (an operational analysis of the limits to definability in free quantum electromagnetic field theory [12] ); and later, in 1950, an attempt at a comparable study of the interacting theory [13] . But the panalophy of levers, trapdoors and springs so introduced seemed little sort of baroque.
Bohr was surely disappointed by the failure of complementarity in other fields. Whilst he still held out the hope of applications of complementarity to biology and the social sciences in 1958, he was markedly less optimistic in his final comments on the subject in 1962, a few months before his death. There he acknowledged that the use of teleological explanations in biology did not in fact imply any restriction on the application of physics to that field, adding, in a departure from his text, that "in the last resort, it is a matter of how one makes headway in biology. I think that the feeling of wonder which the physicists had thirty years ago has taken a new turn. Life will always be a wonder, but what changes is the balance between the feeling of wonder and the courage to try to understand" [10, p.26] (The implication, that with complementarity one did not have the courage to understand, was surely unintended.) question our whole reading of his philosophy. But it is much worse on Heisenberg's reading, that the "Copenhagen" interpretation, as he called it, was based on the need to introduce "the observer" in physics; 21 These results, which the coherence and experimental verification of the new mechanics have placed beyond any doubt, can in no way be reconciled with the pilot-wave theory. The latter leads in particular 21 Heisenberg's reading of orthodoxy made a happy target, in different ways, for Popper, Feyerabend, and Hanson, who thereby helped to popularize it (I am indebted to Don Howard for this and other observations on this history.) 22 For example, the electron may be at rest within the atom, despite the Coulomb interaction; a photon reflected from a mirror may be perfectly at rest. (These examples were pointed out by Brillouin at the 5th Solvay conference [34, p.120, 137-40, 266 ].) to a well-defined value of the linear momentum and does not allow us to obtain the uncertainty relations. [18, p.177] The remark was made by none other than de Broglie, a quarter of a century after the 5th Solvay conference; he allowed it to stand even after reading Bohm's papers of 1952. It shows how hard it was for him to accept that the dynamical quantities revealed by experiment were not the real ones outside of the measurement context, and vice versa.
Total energy, kinetic energy, momentum and spin as revealed by measurement are not in general to be found in the particle trajectories [14] . The pilotwave theory is contextual with respect to all of them, in the technical sense, as what the pilot-wave theory does not deliver is a causal, spacetime account of those very variables, across all contexts -just because they do not attach to the particle trajectories. In this sense, it may even be said, the pilot-wave theory is no counter-example to the principle of complementarity.
